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The Sociology of a Market Analysis Tool: How Industry 
Analysts Sort Vendors and Organize Markets 
Neil Pollock & Robin Williams 
University of Edinburgh 
Abstract 
The information technology (IT) marketplace is shaped by new kinds of specialist industry 
analysts that link technology supply and use through offering a commodified form of 
knowledge and advice. We focus on the work of one such organisation, the Gartner 
Group, and with how it produces a market analysis tool called the ‘Magic Quadrant’. 
Widely circulated amongst the IT community, the device compares and sorts vendors 
according to a number of more or less intangible properties (such as vendor ‘competence’ 
and ‘vision’). Given that potential adopters of IT systems are drawn to assess the 
reputation and likely behaviour of vendors, these tools play an important role in mediating 
choice during procurement. Our interest is in understanding how such objects are 
constructed and how they wield influence. We draw on the recent ‘performativity’ debate 
in Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Finance to show how Magic Quadrants are 
not simply describing but reshaping aspects of the IT arena. Importantly, in sketching this 
sociology of a market analysis tool, we also attend to the contested nature of the Magic 
Quadrant. Whilst Gartner attempt to establish this device as an ‘impartial’ and ‘legitimate’ 
arbiter of vendor performance, it is often viewed sceptically on the grounds that the 
industry analysts are not independent of those vendors they are assessing.  
 
 
Keywords: Industry analysts; reputation; performativity; markets; calculation; community 
knowledge; assessment  
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1 Introduction 
The market for complex IT is undergoing changes in nature and operation (Sawyer 2001). 
It is shaped by new kinds of specialist intermediary organisations (such as the Gartner 
Group, Forrester Research, the Meta Group, the Giga Group, International Data 
Corporation) which link technology supply and use through offering commodified forms 
of knowledge and advice. Industry analysts and IT research firms have been increasingly 
successful in exploiting the uncertainties that exist in technology procurement through 
generating assessments of the relative location and standing of individual vendors and the 
efficacies of their products. These assessments have proven to be extremely effective in 
swaying procurement decisions and influencing vendor product strategies. Moreover, 
demand for such advice is large and growing (with bigger firms spending annually up to 
£1 million on IT research [Konicki & Gilbert 2001]). Yet despite its growing importance, 
not much is known about this form of expertise, the characteristics of knowledge 
produced, or the kind of influence exerted in shaping the IT marketplace.  
 
It is widely acknowledged that user organisations find it difficult to critically assess and 
evaluate large IT solutions prior to purchase (Tingling & Parent 2004). These substantial 
and often business critical decisions about what may be major strategic investments 
(costing perhaps several millions of pounds) are carried out infrequently and businesses 
often lack the expertise and experience needed for effective decision-making. One 
difficulty adopters face is they are assessing not just technical but intangible issues 
regarding the future performance of technology vendors (will they survive?), their 
behaviour (will they invest in the market in coming years?), as well as the differences 
between technologies (Callon et al. 2002). Making sense of these kinds of uncertainties is 
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proving difficult and provoking confusion amongst adopters about how to proceed 
(Tingling & Parent 2004). Whereas in the past, adopters might resort to ‘personal’ or 
‘professional’ networks for advice, these informal avenues for knowledge exchange no 
longer seem to match up to the challenge of appraising today’s technologies in terms of 
the growing range, escalating complexity and rapid evolution of products (Fincham et al. 
1994, Swan & Newell 1995, Glückler &Armbruster 2003).  
 
Today, however, specialist industry analyst and IT research organisations have taken 
centre stage in the IT procurement market (Burks 2006). We see the growth of these actors 
as a response to the deep uncertainties surrounding the procurement of organisational IT 
but also an opportunity created by these experts to enhance their own expansion (Wright 
2002). Thus, industry analysts fulfil a crucial role in shaping expectations about the 
development of technological fields and constituting markets for constantly changing 
supplier offerings (Firth & Swanson 2005, Wang & Swanson 2007). It is they who hold 
the ropes and set the rules of the game. In particular, they define the criteria by which 
vendors and offerings are judged, as well as drawing up assessments of the relative 
performance and standing of these organisations (Ramiller & Swanson 2003).  
 
Our overall purpose is to call for greater attention to be given to how the marketplace for 
complex IT is organised by these actors and, in particular, to the construction of market 
analysis tools. This is part of a broader analytical objective to move the social study of IT 
beyond its founding concerns and approaches which includes finding ways to link the 
strengths of currently dominant modes of study (detailed interactionist, ethnographic 
study) with broader forms of analysis to understand how these actors shape markets and 
influence local action (see author study). In this paper, we also show two specific aspects:  
 4 
i) the process by which a group of industry analysts attempts to capture or, better 
still, ‘produce’ the character and status of vendors so that they can be ranked 
on a common plane;  
ii) the often complicated way in which these organisations attempt to establish 
their research as an ‘impartial’ and ‘legitimate’ arbiter of vendor performance.  
To do this we investigate work of one of the leading IT research firm (the Gartner Group) 
and the construction of its market analysis tool called the ‘Magic Quadrant’. This device is 
widely circulated amongst the IT community to compare and rank vendors according to a 
number of evaluative criteria, which include intangible properties like vendor 
‘competence’ and ‘vision’. Given that potential adopters of large IT systems are drawn to 
assess the reputation of vendors during procurement, these tools play an important role in 
mediating choice (Schultz et al. 2001).  
 
Crucially, however, whilst this market analysis has a large audience, it also appears to 
divide opinion. Some have described this a ‘low status’ and often ‘flawed’ form of 
expertise (Keiser 2002), emphasising how assessments are regularly wide of the mark. It is 
also frequently viewed sceptically on the grounds that analysts are not always independent 
of those they evaluate (Greenemeier & McDougall 2006). Indeed, the ability of industry 
analysts to play their role (and sell their services) depends on their being seen to operate in 
a close relation to practice (Sturdy 1997). Yet this complicated (often ‘sticky’) relationship 
with vendors has led to accusations of ‘partiality’ and ‘bias’ (Cant 2002). Interestingly, 
and rather counter-intuitively, this does not seem to have dampened enthusiasm for the 
research (the top firms report continued growth in revenues and client numbers – see Firth 
and Swanson 2005). Moreover, these organisations have not stood still in light of 
criticisms and are seeking to make their processes open to certain kinds of scrutiny 
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(reflected in the strenuous attention they devote to legitimating their position as impartial 
bearers of community knowledge in the face of criticisms of partisanship).  
 
1.1 The Magic in the Magic Quadrant 
Gartner are primus inter pares amongst industry analysts and have been particularly 
successful in mobilising belief and expectations amongst both supplier and user 
communities.1 Amongst the various forms of prediction and assessment it provides, there 
is perhaps none more influential or contested than the ‘Magic Quadrant’ (MQ). In the 
words of its authors, these are ‘…graphical portrayals of vendor performance in a market 
segment which summarizes a given market and its significant vendors at a point in time’ 
(Gartner 2000). The MQ is an attempt to compare and rank software vendors according to 
a number of predefined measures. It comes in the form of a box with an X and Y-axis 
(labelled as ‘completeness of vision’ and ‘ability to execute’) and inside of which there is 
a further four squares into which one can see placed the names of several vendors (see 
Figure 1).2 These vendors are not randomly placed; each of the squares is individually 
labelled (niche player, challenger, visionary and leader). The position of a vendor in a 
particular square signifies something regarding the current and future performance of the 
vendor and its behaviour within the particular market sector it is targeting (Burton & 
Aston 2004).  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
                                                 
1 Founded by Gideon Gartner in 1979, the Gartner Group has its headquarters in Stamford, Connecticut and offices in over 80 places 
around the world. It has 4,300 associates of which 1,400 are described as ‘expert analysts’ and ‘consultants’. 
2 This figure is adapted from Harwood (2002). 
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However, these devices turn out to be potentially difficult to study (and their influence 
therefore hard to assess). One reason (already noted) is that they are typically what we 
might call ‘dividing objects’. That is, the MQ enjoys extensive diffusion, being widely 
acknowledged as ‘one of the most referenced research tools in the IT sector’, but, at the 
same time, it is also seen as ‘highly simplistic’ and ‘flawed’.3 Intriguingly these views are 
not always the opinions of different communities but often of the same groups. The people 
who appear to use these tools are also seemingly among its biggest critics. How are we to 
make sense of this form of market analysis that is seen as problematic but still widely 
used?; which is controversial but also said to be effective in comparing the performance of 
vendors?  
 
There are three possible ways of analysing the tool, only one of which helps in our task. A 
first strategy, perhaps the one favoured by critical social scientists, would be to debunk the 
tool. It is after all a version of the classic two-by-two matrix much beloved by European 
and American Business Schools. In this respect it would be relatively easy to reveal the 
limitations and imperfections of these tools, which are manifold (not least that they 
‘flatten the world’ through hiding its complexity). However, we do not think this wholly 
productive.4 A second strategy, more analytical than the first, might be to treat them as a 
‘convention’. This would be to explain their success through the fact they enjoy 
                                                 
3 A high ranking on a MQ is said to guarantee a vendor more attention than its rivals (Hind 2004); and some argue that it even has the 
power to ‘make or break’ a technology (Violino & Levin 1997). At the same time, it has been denounced as devoid of ‘intrinsic value’ 
and as a mere ‘marketing tool’ (Howard 2004). It is said to be overly ‘subjective’ in the way it is compiled, leading to accusations of 
‘partiality’ and ‘bias’ (Cant 2002). There have also been various critical discussions with respect to how the tool actually classifies 
vendors and the limitations of the measures it uses for its analysis (Columbus 2005; Greenemeier and McDougall 2006; Whitehorn 
2007). 
4 A simple debunking strategy is not useful because it fails to explain how this form of research has influence. Nor does it give us the 
ability to or tools to explain the success or failure of these tools. We therefore recommend a critical but more productive form of 
analysis. For further discussion of this issue, see the recent exchange in the journal Organization Studies on how various disciplinary 
biases shape our perspective on the work of groups like management consultants (Armbrüster & Glückler 2007). 
 7 
widespread take-up and use. Indeed, social scientists have used these arguments to good 
effect in the domain of Science and Technology Policy, for instance, where Arie Rip 
amongst others (Rip 2006; Borup et al. 2006) have described the extension of similar 
kinds of objects in these terms. However, whilst we agree that the MQ is a convention, we 
cannot accept the implication that all conventions are completely ‘arbitrary’ and without 
‘content’, which is the reading one finds in Rip’s article. An alternative strategy - the one 
pursued here - would be to open up this ‘black box’ to study the production of the tool to 
see how vendor rankings emerge from this contested socio-technical arrangement. In 
doing this we set in train a specific line of inquiry. We show how the MQ is 
‘performative’. That is, it does not merely describe a state of affairs that already exists in 
the marketplace; but nor does it simply offer a new means of representing and positioning 
vendors; rather it is also interacting with and modifying its object of study. Indeed the 
principal contention pursued here is that the MQ has become ‘successful’ because it is 
(re)shaping the technological field.  
 
The article is organised as follows: we first discuss the emergence of industry analysts as a 
body of experts; we then focus on recent debates within Science and Technology Studies 
(STS), Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Science on the ‘performativity’ of 
theories and models; and finally we discuss our research methodology and approach. We 
then introduce and analyse our empirical material and conclude by discussing its 
implications for understanding the organisation of the IT market. 
 
2 The Growing Influence of Industry Analysts 
Industry analysts provide organisational consumers with research on the nature of the IT 
market. Some (like the ones discussed here) have an international reputation and a large 
 8 
audience for their work. There are various reasons why these kinds of experts have 
achieved growing influence. We review some of the principal factors here.  
 
2.1 Assessing Informational Products 
The IT sector is widely acknowledged to be among the most complex of terrains for 
organisational consumers attempting to acquire new information systems (Tingling and 
Parent 2004). It is typified by accelerated rates of technical change involving the constant 
development and proliferation of new solutions onto the market. These are rarely ‘similar’ 
solutions insofar as vendors continuously attempt to differentiate their technologies from 
those of their rivals, newer systems from previous versions, niche specific offerings from 
generic ones, and so on. In the case of complex non-material artefacts, such as Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) and other packaged organisational technologies, the selection 
and comparative assessment of supplier offerings presents particular challenges (Tingling 
& Parent 2004). They are what Williamson (1985) has described as ‘informational 
products’, meaning it is extremely hard to assess their properties since these cannot be 
readily disclosed by inspection (but are only verified in their organisational 
implementation and use) (Fincham et al. 1994; Wang 2002). Williamson (1975) draws 
attention to a condition of ‘information impactedness’ between the various players in 
procurement, particularly where the inability of adopters to scrutinize the process may 
encourage opportunistic behaviour by vendors. There has thus been increasing attention to 
the role of trust and reputation as factors inhibiting opportunistic behaviour by vendors, 
providing an incentive against moral hazard and in overcoming adverse selection by 
providing an indirect indicator of vendor capabilities and performance. The lack of 
reliable knowledge about the capacity and behaviour of vendors and the efficacy of their 
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products has forced buyers to resort to more systematic and impersonal ‘reputational’ 
indices of vendor behaviour (Gluckler & Armbruster 2003). 
 
Today, however, the institutional frameworks for promoting and assessing complex IT 
solutions are becoming better established as can be seen by analysing the changes in the 
processes of assessment of technologies in the course of procurement. In the 1980s, for 
instance, consultancy organisations were beginning to collate information about supplier 
offerings and the new kinds of IT available, followed in the 1990s by the growth in 
popularity of specialist industry analysts and IT research firms, which gathered 
information on competing vendors in the IT marketplace (Firth & Swanson 2005). 
Towards the end of the 20th Century we see the emergence of a much more elaborate 
system of consultancy and advice where industry analysts rank and sort vendors by 
making available what we describe below as ‘community experience’ on a more 
commodified basis. In other words, through actively soliciting and collecting the opinions 
of vendor customers, industry analysts have begun to act as repositories and organisers of 
community knowledge about the implementation of particular products and about the 
reputation of its vendors. Such knowledge can be readily exploited to form the basis of 
market analysis tools and can be traded by industry analysts extremely profitably (as they 
charge user organisations for access to their assessments based upon submissions by 
vendors and on freely-provided experiences from its user community). However, this kind 
of explanation itself does not provide much insight into how this form of knowledge, 
which is surrounded by uncertainty and scepticism, has become influential.  
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2.2 The Emergence of a New Profession 
There has been much written in the field of STS, Information Systems and Management 
research about the interesting ‘grey spaces’ that novel forms of knowledge sometimes 
occupy. Preda (2007) discusses the birth of the ‘Chartist’ movement and focuses on how 
early proponents eventually persuaded initially sceptical stock market traders that 
‘forecasts’ about the price of stocks would be a useful addition to current working 
practices. This research focuses on how these experts, in the face of questions about the 
benefits and provenance of this kind of information, slowly began to establish their 
‘credibility’ (Preda 2005). Turner (2001) provides another view on the emergence of new 
professional groups, distinguishing between experts for whom there exists a predefined 
audience and those who actively have to create a following. Jones (2003) follows this 
theme, focusing on how IT consultants do not straightforwardly ‘possess’ expertise but 
have to continually validate this expertise with clients. They do so, Jones argues, through 
routinely demonstrating their competence and knowledge of specific areas. Jones 
suggests, as does Preda, that these experts are ultimately successful because they actively 
shape users’ perceptions of what kinds of knowledge and help are needed. Indeed the bulk 
of the literature portrays these actors as actively ‘selling’ solutions. In other words, they 
configure users to appreciate and incorporate this new knowledge into their activities (see 
also Bloomfield & Danieli [1995] who deploy a similar argument).  
 
Whilst these views all have their merits, our case is perhaps more complicated (and leads 
us to a somewhat different conclusion). The clients of industry analysts were not simply 
trusting of this kind of research (though they did appear to hold many of the individual 
analysts in high regard). Nor were they simply configured to appreciate and accept 
assessments. If anything, they were sophisticated and wary consumers of this knowledge 
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(they joked, for instance, about the possibility that the MQ might be ‘flawed’!). Despite 
this, however, the tool was treated as ‘real’ even though people knew it to be a simplified 
convention. What we found then was an unusual situation where the research was viewed 
sceptically but used in practice. This suggests we need to look elsewhere to understand the 
influence of industry analysts – and more specifically to investigate not the experts but the 
role of the device itself. To do this, we turn to a review of how these kinds of tools have 
been conceptualised within other parts of the critical social sciences.  
 
2.3 Where is the Sociology of Market Analysis Tools?  
Whilst tools like the MQ have been a feature of business settings for over several decades 
now, they still attract relatively little attention from scholars interested in the social 
analysis of technology. There is nowhere near an adequate sociological language, for 
instance, to describe their success or failure. The few studies that do discuss them 
seemingly only do so to demonstrate their flaws (see Lissack & Richardson [2003] who go 
as far as to suggest that some of these tools might even be ‘unethical’). Whatever the 
reason for this, it is clear that there are too few sociological accounts of the genesis and 
influence of these market analysis tools. There are exceptions, of course, as exemplified 
by recent work in the sub-discipline of Business History (see particularly Ghemawhat 
[2002] and his lengthy discussion of the ‘Boston Matrix’). Our own field of STS appears, 
at first glance, well equipped to understand their nature and influence, given its 
longstanding interest in the models produced by scientists and engineers (see Morgan & 
Morrison 1999). Yet the small amount of research that has been conducted so far on 
industry analysts does not adequately reflect their complexity, but overwhelmingly tends 
to focus on the intrinsically flawed, simplistic assumptions embedded in their assessments, 
the often contested nature of analysts’ research, the cases of failed predictions, etc. (see 
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Bloomfield & Vurdubakis 2002). The role and presence of such organisations is not 
adequately explained. Nor has anyone satisfactorily reconciled the contradiction where 
such seemingly highly limited forms of research both command a significant price and 
have extensive influence (nor have they addressed how this kind of knowledge frames 
decision-making and patterns the conduct and outcome of local actions).  
 
Scholars working in the science and technology policy area, for instance, have described 
the models and predictions of industry analysts as ‘folk theories’, to capture the way 
certain tools evolve out of practice rather than academic research and to point to how the 
veracity of this research comes not from its accuracy per se but the fact it is widely taken-
up and used (Rip 2006, Borup et al. 2006). However, whilst this work is suggestive, their 
terminology is problematic as it places emphasis only on the diffusion and acceptance of 
this knowledge rather than its production. The implicit reading is that this advice is 
‘arbitrary’ without ‘content’. Indeed some have gone as far to describe this form of 
knowledge as ‘lacking research’ (Rip 2006, 353) and in some cases ‘plainly wrong’ (ibid.: 
353). In short, the intellectual work of industry analysts have been dismissed outright; 
scholars have failed to investigate their emergence and lifecycle, which leads to 
unsatisfactory accounts of their influence.  
 
 
2.4 The Performativity of Market Analysis 
We are dissatisfied with these portrayals of intermediary groups like industry analysts and 
IT research firms current within much of the social sciences, particularly when it seems 
that industry analysts produce their assessments through systematic, albeit complicated, 
forms of research and that their tools do exert powerful albeit complex forms of influence. 
Our thinking is influenced by scholars sensitive to the role that theories play in 
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constituting economic markets. Recent work from Economic Sociology (Callon 1998, 
1999, 2007) and the Sociology of Finance (MacKenzie 2003, 2006 a,b), for instance, 
argues that economic theories and financial tools are ‘performative’; that is, they not only 
describe but can help produce the settings in which they are applied. Through their 
application, theories and their related tools change how people think about markets and go 
on to enact the ‘framing’ processes that serve to allow their operation. This is an important 
insight, which, if it can be used to illuminate the study of economic and financial 
transactions in general, can also aid our understanding of the workings of industry analysts 
within the IT arena. 
 
The actual notion of ‘performativity’ stems from the work of the linguistic philosopher 
J.L. Austin (1962) who wrote that a statement was performative when it did more than just 
describe a reality but was instead actively engaged in the constitution of that reality (c.f. 
Barnes 1983). This begs the question (and here we highlight the limitations of the concept 
of folk theory when applied to these tools) as to whether any kind of assessment is 
possible. Could industry analysts make whatever judgement they choose? In Austin’s 
original discussion, he was careful to avoid discussing the ‘veracity’ of performatives. 
What was important was not whether statements were true or false but how, in actually 
making them, the speaker was ‘setting something in motion’ (Callon 2007: 320). Callon 
has built on this argument in two ways: through replacing the concept of truth and falsity 
with ‘success’ and ‘failure’; and setting out a partial framework to study whether 
performatives have ‘successfully’ brought about that which they previously set in motion.  
 
This first point is relatively straightforward, especially for those familiar with the 
pragmatism of Actor Network Theory, but the second less so. What Callon intends is that 
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performatives do not exist in isolation; they have meaning and effect in the ‘world’ they 
create for themselves.5 Callon describes theories and their world as a socio-technical 
agencement. The term (derived from the work of Deleuze and Guattari) is used to depict a 
heterogneous collection of material and textual elements that act on and modify each 
other. As Callon notes there is nothing ‘outside’ a socio-technical agencement – theories 
or descriptions of the agencement, for instance, are not ‘external’ but part of the 
configuration, acting and bringing it into being. Callon argues that a theory is successful 
(performative) when it can create its corresponding socio-technical agencement.6 One 
other important aspect is the assertion that no one element (human or nonhuman) is 
assumed a priori to be more important than any other; they all, methodologically at least, 
have equal status, and in this sense they all can act. It is because of the implied symmetry 
here that Callon can argue that theories also set worlds in motion.  
 
Employing these ideas Callon (1998, 1999) can therefore suggest that the ‘market’ and 
‘homo economicus’ are no longer ideas that exist simply in economic text books but are 
continuously enacted within the economy. If people trade and purchase goods in a 
‘market’ (as opposed to any of the other ways the exchange of goods might occur) then 
this is because economic notions of the market have successfully constructed a socio-
technical agencement. Callon emphasises that the mechanisms enabling this are not part of 
human nature (actors in Callon’s view have a variable ontology) but are actively 
constructed and that academic economics has played a role in this performation. 
                                                 
5 This notion of a ‘world’ is important for Callon’s argument. Drawing on semiotics, he points to how statements are ‘indexical’, 
meaning they are always ‘located’ (referring to particular circumstances, time and space). To say the same thing in different words, a 
‘statement contains its own context’. Statements cannot exist outside their context but require this context or ‘world’ (to the language 
Callon prefers).  
6 Callon writes that a theory or formula imposes a world or ‘socio-technical agencements outside of which it cannot survive’ (2007: 
324). A formula ‘progressively discovers its world’ and that there is a world ‘put into motion by the formula describing it’ (ibid: 320). 
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Moreover, actors and objects are so thoroughly entangled in other (competing) socio-
technical agencements that there have to be processes of ‘framing’ and ‘disentanglement’ 
if economic man is to exist. If this framing is successful then a socio-technical agencement 
can give an actor the ability to ‘act’.7  
 
In what follows, we will analyse the MQ as a socio-technical agencement to show how it 
implies and gradually enacts a new world. This includes how Gartner set out an alternative 
way to describe of vendors as well as a research process they construct to enable their 
comparison and ranking. Using Callon’s argument we can say that the MQ is successful 
(i.e., performative) when it is able to bring about the world that it points to (i.e., actors 
come to think of others and themselves according to these terms). We finish by showing 
how the MQ becomes part of the equipment allowing people to act in the IT market. 
 
3 Research Method 
Researching the work of industry analysts is very difficult indeed (and this may be one 
reason for the paucity of studies). This is because these organisations are highly guarded 
when talking about their work, which is perhaps not surprising since many of them have 
been the subject of much criticism (especially from the practitioner press). Another 
difficult relates to ‘where’ to study these actors. MQs are not shaped in one specific place 
but across what we describe below as a ‘calculative network’. Thus during fieldwork the 
only way to study this phenomena was to focus on the interactions of IT research firms 
with other players across organisational settings. This meant we conducted our fieldwork 
in inter-organisational nexuses rather than within the confines of particular organisations. 
                                                 
7 In this last respect, the notion of socio-technical agencement has two meanings: it depicts the various equipment, tools and prosthesis 
that allow people to calculate; and it captures the fact that actors are constituted by the various agencements surrounding them (Hardie 
& MacKenzie 2007).  
 16 
Indeed, this explains where our initial interest in industry analysts was born. We had been 
conducting a long-term research project on software vendors and their interactions with 
user communities and various others (author study). We had chosen to study the 
supplier/user nexus and the complex web of relations that existed between them, which, in 
turn, alerted us to the important role of these kinds of intermediaries. Having established a 
good relationship with one particular IT manager (described here as ‘Sergio’) working at a 
user organisation (described here as ‘UserOrg’), we were observing him when he 
subscribed to the services of Gartner and begun to interact with them on a regular basis. 
Before long Sergio had established what looked like a strong working relationship with 
one particular analyst (described here as ‘Bob’) and in doing so appeared to have become 
an important actor in the shaping of the MQ. It was mostly through our observations of 
Sergio that we opened up a window onto the world of industry analysts. Importantly, it 
meant we could follow the shaping of the MQ for one particular market sector over a 
period of a year. 
 
3.1 Data Collection 
We gathered most of the insights presented here during ethnographic research where we 
were able to view Gartner from a number of different analytical viewpoints. There were 
three main sources of data. Firstly, we found observing industry analysts ‘in action’ 
(Latour 1987) to be very fruitful where one of the authors (NP) attended a number of IT 
forums. We supplemented this method of data gathering with informal discussions. NP 
was able to question Gartner analysts, the vendors subject to these assessments, as well as 
the clients and users of industry this form of research. Whilst this was a demanding and 
often intrusive form of research, it gave us access to what would normally be ‘private’ 
discussions that included sensitive topics. NP’s prior ethnographic practice (as well as his 
 17 
technical background and market knowledge) allowed him quickly to become considered 
an ‘insider’ (Forsythe 1999).8 Secondly, we conducted formal interviews with vendors and 
IT practitioners to ask them about their involvement and relationship with Gartner. 
Thirdly, we had access to Gartner documentation and reports (some of which were 
available freely on the internet and others were sent to us by one of the Gartner clients we 
were observing). Finally, and one of the most important sources of data we drew on, were 
electronic mail exchanges between Sergio, particular Gartner analysts and a software 
vendor. Much of the discussion about (and interactions with) Gartner took place via email 
which meant we had unfettered access to the important effects this kind of assessment was 
having on vendors and users alike as well as with how these actors attempted to shape 
Gartner’s view. Sergio helpfully provided us with direct access to his email account over 
the period of a year giving us the ability to accumulate hundreds of emails. 
 
3.2 Data Analysis 
In terms of how we conducted our analysis and arrived at our findings, our work has been 
influenced by two interrelated aims. Firstly, as we have said, our overall purpose is to 
develop sociological work on the IT marketplace which includes assessing the potential 
for an empirically grounded characterisation of the methods by which industry analysts 
produce and communicate their assessments. The popular conception of IT research firms 
is to see assessments as constructed ‘in the heads’ of individual analysts. This contrasts 
with the fieldwork reported here which suggests that the creation of assessments cannot be 
put down simply to the vagaries of individual discretion but result from more observable 
‘social’ and ‘distributed’ processes; hence our call for a sociology of market analysis 
                                                 
8
 Though we are able to record and transcribe formal interviews, the sensitivity of these informal intra- and 
inter-organisational settings meant that we were frequently obliged to dispense with tape recording and rely 
instead upon field notes. 
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tools; and an argument exemplified by our discussion below of ‘community knowledge’. 
This links to our second purpose, which is to understand the relative influence of the tools 
and assessments produced by industry analysts as well as how we might provide evidence 
of their sway. Indeed, the case of industry analysts appears to build on the emerging 
performativity thesis. Here we are dealing with more complicated forms of influence than, 
for instance, financial theories. Beunza and colleagues (2006), for instance, show how 
financial research can modify a ‘price’, where there is a relatively ‘straight line’ between 
theory and setting. In contrast, the assessments of industry analysts may change the 
trajectory of complex software products, though in so doing so they may be in competition 
with other ‘competing’ performative statements. No one actor ‘owns’ this space. 
However, we argue that industry analysts have emerged recently as particularly influential 
player. 
 
 
4 Case Study 
4.1 The Genesis of the Magic Quadrant 
Let us begin by discussing the genesis of the MQ. Articles in the practitioner-focused 
press have attempted to discuss its history but always reach the same conclusion – ‘no one 
is really sure’. Something of a mythology has grown up around the object (Whitehorn 
2007). From our own discussions with Gartner we know it first appeared around the mid-
1980s but interestingly, and something that helps sustain its mythology, our informant was 
also uncertain about how it was first developed. She identified the tool as stemming from 
the work of two particular consultants but was unsure as to when it was first used (and she 
even suspected it to have begun its life with a different name):  
We believe the first presentation use of the quadrant (though it wasn't called that at 
the time) was in 1986 at Gartner's Scenario conference…. We looked through our 
Scenario conference binders from 1985 to 1987 - did not find any MQs in the 1985 
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binder, one in 1986 and 1987. The analysts who used it at that conference were 
Mike Braude and Peter Levine in their Software Management Strategies Scenario - 
again, though it wasn't formally called a MQ. Given our rigid discipline back in the 
1980s of limiting Research Notes to two pages, we suspect that the MQ 
appearance in presentations most likely predates their appearance in a Research 
Note, but are uncertain. Nor can we be certain that it wasn't used at another 
‘theme’ conference earlier in 1986 (correspondence between Gartner and authors). 
 
Despite continuing to ask, we were unable to uncover the MQ’s original name, so can 
throw no further light on the issue.9 However, we were fortunate in being able to observe 
one senior Gartner analyst discuss early thinking on decision making within the 
information systems domain (and specifically with how they were attempting to change 
the nature of technological assessment).  
 
4.2 A New Comparative Machinery? 
We originally approached our study of the MQ using conventional forms of analysis. We 
too had initially conceived of the tool as a ‘convention’ that was mostly ‘arbitrary’, that 
was successful through its widespread diffusion and take-up, all of which was bolstered by 
Gartner’s standing in the IT marketplace. Thus, one of the authors (NP) was genuinely 
surprised to find himself sitting listening to a talk that pointed to a rather different story. 
To give some indication of this we present a lengthy extract from a presentation given by 
a senior Gartner analyst to a large audience of IT professionals and practitioners. 
Typically, this analyst delivered the keynote speech each year at this particular conference 
and one of the themes he had decided to reflect on this time around was the history of 
decision making within information systems procurement. The analyst began by 
discussing the means by which people traditionally assessed systems prior to purchase:  
                                                 
9
 All Gartner’s early research is housed in a storage facility to which our informant did not have access. 
MQ’s inventors have long since left Gartner for new positions, and one has since retired. 
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…we put together [in the 1990s] an outline of how you should evaluate 
administrative applications... And, we looked at functionality, costs, service, 
support, technology, vision of the company and ability to execute. And what we 
said was that in a stable environment you would look at ‘functionality’… That was 
pretty much what we were looking at. Why? Well a mainframe is a mainframe so 
technology wasn’t that different from one to another, it was basically a vendor’s 
box that you were buying but it was built around a common architecture. When 
you looked in terms of cost, that was the driving factor for us; And service and 
support? We really didn’t think much about vision of the company or their ability 
to execute we just bought what they had to offer… So, we had some need but it 
was kind of focusing on functionality and cost. What we said in ‘97 was change. 
You need to look at functionality but most vendor packages are mature enough to 
where there is at least common functionality, so it is a matter of goodness of fit that 
you are looking at… And we started seeing that trend in the early 80s…that said 
we had ageing of systems, people were using these systems…whether they were 
proprietary or home-grown for 15, 20, 25 years… And, the point is that you had to 
look at buying software as being a partnership with a vendor, and that’s a long-
term relationship. It’s not something short term. And so, the vision of the company 
- do they understand the business of [specific sector]? Do they know where you 
were going? - and the ability to execute, those are still crucial. We still say it is 
about half of what your criteria should be. Now, if I am a…Chief Financial 
Officer…I am probably going to look at functionality as being crucial. That’s fine. 
But somebody better look out for the good of the [institution] as a whole. Because 
your institutional perspective is the one that we’re responsible to look out for in IT 
(our emphasis).  
 
There were at least three moves in this long extract. Firstly, we saw the problematisation 
of the conventional approach to information systems assessment. His critique particularly 
focused on the measures people were using (‘functionality’, ‘cost’, ‘service’, etc.) which 
he suggested were no longer as effective in sorting out vendors as they once were. How 
could you select between vendors using the criteria of ‘technology’ when systems were no 
longer significantly ‘different from one another’? How effective was ‘functionality’ when 
vendors increasingly offered ‘common functionality’? The analyst also thought it had now 
become necessary to replace current measures as user organisations tended to use the same 
solution for longer. Nowadays, he argued, user increasingly had ‘partnerships’ with 
vendors, the implication being that organisational consumers needed to assess not only 
systems but also distinctive characteristics of the vendors themselves. In other words, he 
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was suggesting a shift in decision making from the evaluation of functional and local 
concerns to more ‘strategic’ ones. In addition, and in order to do this, he mentioned how a 
potential adopter might apply Gartner’s own evaluation criteria from the MQ when 
evaluating vendors - which they term as ‘ability to execute’ and ‘completeness of vision’.  
 
A second move was that Gartner were proposing to reframe decision making through 
bringing into being new kinds of actors. We do not think it is overstating the point by 
talking about the MQ in this way (to think of Gartner as attempting to produce a way for 
vendors ‘to be’). A vendor’s ‘ability to execute’, or their ‘completeness of vision’, did not 
exist prior to Gartner’s intervention; they are ways of seeing vendors established by 
Gartner. This is not to say that others have never conceived of vendors in strategic terms 
(they have: see for instance the discussion of the Boston Matrix by Ghemawhat [2002]). 
Our argument is that Gartner are attempting to extend this through reframing decision-
making and ‘remaking’ vendors in this strategic guise. Moreover, their intervention, as we 
will demonstrate, is making a difference to vendors, who increasingly think of themselves 
in these ways, and the users of Gartner research, where ‘ability to execute’ and 
‘completeness of vision’ were seen as unproblematic, assessable vendor properties.  
 
The third move was that these strategic criteria prioritise comparative forms of assessment 
rather than local accuracy. That is, they give form to ‘ordinal’ characteristics as opposed to 
those that establish commensurability with local sites.10 In the earlier decision making 
frame, vendors were assessed on measures that were effective in detailing how a potential 
system related to the needs and shape of a specific user (i.e., they were ‘accurate’) but 
                                                 
10 Theodore Porter has argued that there are strong incentives in both the sciences and the economy for precise and standardizable 
measures rather than highly ‘accurate’ ones. He writes ‘[f]or most purposes, accuracy is meaningless if the same operations and 
measurements cannot be performed at other sites’ (1995: 29).  
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provided little purchase on how vendors compared in catering for such requirements (i.e., 
they were not ordinal measures). By contrast, the new frame renders vendors 
commensurable with each other, as was Gartner’s intent (Burton & Aston 2004). Thus, we 
can say that MQs generate comparisons that do not exist elsewhere.11 In short, we are 
arguing the MQ is transformative and that in producing the tool Gartner were 
reconstituting the ‘technological field’ from one where people were concerned with local 
and functional issues to more strategic ones. However, the world that Gartner are 
attempting to set out also requires a research process – a method to gather information 
about vendors. It is this to which we now turn, showing how this is one of the most 
controversial aspects of the tool.  
 
4.3 Constructing a Research Process 
Gartner do not entirely calculate Magic Quadrants within the boundaries of their own 
organisation. They are partially the product of interactions analysts have with the vendors 
themselves and a geographically dispersed network of vendor customers. In this section, 
we discuss these groups through conceptualising how the former respond to the tool and 
then with how the latter are organised into what might be thought of as ‘calculative 
networks’. We describe the information flowing within these networks as ‘community 
knowledge’ and discuss Gartner’s attempt at objectifying and commodifying this 
knowledge. 
 
When one of our research team was able to ask a senior analyst about the construction of 
the tool, he would say very little about them except to emphasise how: they were the result 
                                                 
11 Through bringing vendors together in the same space, and through producing new relationships between them (Callon & Muniesa 
2005), we might therefore describe the MQ as a technology of comparison as opposed to one of accuracy.  
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of a ‘long period of careful research’; they were put together over the period of ‘several 
months’; they involved the work of different Gartner analysts; and that these analysts met 
regularly with vendors and their customers. This is all he would say. However, we were 
only able to find more detail through reading their documentation. One report describes 
how:  
During the research process, we may ask for new information and briefings from 
vendors. We often gather information from vendor-provided references, from 
industry contacts, from unnamed clients, from public sources…and from other 
Gartner analysts (Burton & Aston 2004: 4). 
 
Whilst conducting fieldwork we were able to focus on two of the groups mentioned here: 
we interviewed a number of vendors that had been subject to Gartner’s assessment; and 
we talked with some of these so called ‘unnamed clients’, as well as observing Gartner’s 
interactions with these people. 
 
4.3.1 Vendors Are On the Move 
We spoke to several vendors about their relationship with Gartner. SoleSys (a pseudonym) 
is a US based software package vendor who had been consistently well placed on the MQ.  
This year they were again identified as a ‘Leader’, and they made every effort to publicise 
this. After contacting the Marketing Director of SoleSys to arrange an interview, initially 
about a different issue, for instance, he sent us a recently published MQ to show us how 
they had maintained their position. When we met with him, we took the opportunity to ask 
him about their continuously positive ranking. We broached the subject rather simply 
enquiring whether they ‘marketed themselves to Gartner’. He responded:   
It takes a lot of work, actually [laughing]. And, you don’t really market yourself to 
Gartner as they are very focused on the communications they have with 
corporations. So what they do, if you want to be considered for coverage on the 
Magic Quadrant, they send out a questionnaire in advance of the Quadrant. And it 
ends up being like a 50 page response that is required from a vendor, from, you 
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know, the high level product strategy down to the feature and functionality and 
architecture. So we make an investment to respond to that as thoroughly as 
possible. And, that’s how, where our placement in the Quadrant comes from 
(author interview with Marketing Director, SoleSys).  
 
Whilst polite enough to laugh at our question he did, however, chastise us for the 
suggestion that they ‘marketed themselves’ to Gartner.12 This exchange was instructive. 
Our reading of this was that to be well positioned was far from a simple marketing 
exercise. The respondent from SoleSys was replying to a tacit derogatory definition of 
marketing as ‘selling’ something irrespective of its quality. Instead, he made the point that 
responding to Gartner required much internal ‘investment’ and ‘work’. He went on to 
insist that there needed to be substance behind the claim (even though his description did 
look like straightforward self-promotion and positioning). We thus imagine a dual process 
whereby a vendor has to first disentangle itself from the existing (functional) ways it 
currently conceives of itself and then to reframe these according to more strategic 
measures. This suggests that the subjects of Gartner’s research were ‘on the move’ so to 
speak; the vendors were remaking themselves in terms of the new world Gartner was 
attempting to set out.13  
 
4.3.2 Community Knowledge 
The second group from which MQs were derived are ‘unnamed clients’. These were (as 
far as we can gather) people who were customers of these vendors and, in most cases, but 
not always, subscribers to Gartner research. Gartner’s relationship with this group was 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, other vendors made similar points, often explicitly refuting claims they did anything other than provide ‘real 
information’. This was seen in an email exchange between a different vendor (whom we identify as ‘SoftCo’) and one of its closest 
customers: “We have spent quite a lot of time bringing [the Gartner analyst responsible for their sector] up to speed on what we have 
achieved in terms of development and successful projects. I don't mean just ‘marketing’ to him - I mean real information on real 
achievements, which have not been visible to him” (email from SoftCo to customer). 
13 This resonates with Ian Hacking’s (1999) insightful observation how new classification schemes rarely simply stabilise settings but 
encourage newly sorted actors to act in different ways (often either conforming to, or rebelling from, the classification).  
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particularly interesting. We observed how one particular analyst had built up and was 
managing a large network of people with whom he interacted on a regular basis. These 
people would continuously feed back ‘judgements’ to him on the particular vendors with 
which they were working. During fieldwork, we observed how vendor rankings were 
enacted within these interactions – which constitute what might be thought of as a 
‘calculative network’ (Callon & Muniesa 2005).  
 
We describe this calculative network in more detail below, but for now, we simply sketch 
some of its features. It was ‘selective’ in that analysts kept themselves close to certain 
people and excluded others. It was ‘tactical’ in that people recognised the importance of 
these interactions and used them to further goals. Finally, interactions in the network were 
often highly ‘informal’ – being typically based on telephone calls or quick chats at 
conferences, etc. We might conceive these users who continuously feedback information 
to the analysts as ‘satellites’ and Gartner which, in turn, translates these judgements into 
positions on the MQ, as a ‘centre of calculation’ (Latour 1987). Further, we can 
characterise the information within these networks as ‘community knowledge’ to 
emphasise both its informal and distributed status, as well as its shared provenance. When 
pressed, for instance, Gartner would often deny it was in fact them acting but, rather, they 
were merely representing within the tool knowledge originated by others elsewhere. There 
are obvious parallels with science: both seek to make their knowledge claims ‘objective’; 
though scientists tend to validate their claims in terms of ‘objective nature’ (Shapin 1994), 
whereas Gartner continuously pointed to the community of vendor customers from where 
the claims originated, and, as we will now describe, to a number of research protocols and 
‘qualitative rules’ that sat between this community knowledge and final assessments.  
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4.4 The Commodification of Networked Reputation 
What we are arguing is that Gartner is shaping the world so that ‘community knowledge’ 
is no longer a highly particular and local form of knowledge but one that can travel the 
world. This is to say that this informal knowledge can be commodified and fed back to the 
market. However, these kind of ‘judgements’ were not easily objectified (Porter [1995] 
argues that judgements do not fit straightforwardly into quantification). During fieldwork, 
for instance, we noted how Gartner often struggled to account for the provenance of 
community knowledge and how there was a certain amount of ambiguity surrounding the 
methodological status of the tool. Let us look at the latter aspect before returning to the 
former. In its early life we found the more ‘quantitative’ aspects of the MQ were 
highlighted; and then some years later it was described as resulting from ‘qualitative 
research’. It is typically described today as having a mix of both these aspects: “Gartner 
analysts use a combination of objective and subjective criteria to evaluate individual 
vendors…” (Soejarto & Karamouzis 2005: 5) 
 
When Gartner say the tool includes ‘subjective criteria’, we take it to mean it is shaped 
through analyst interactions with clients. Indeed one might think that incorporating this 
kind of knowledge increases the tool’s credibility, for instance giving weight to the 
argument that Gartner are ‘close to the action’ so to speak.14 It is this community 
knowledge that Gartner are attempting to objectify, to bring into the calculation these 
customer judgements (seen as important but having till now remained outside the frame). 
                                                 
14 The creation of what we are calling ‘calculative networks’ was, we imagine, a response to a practical problem. One analyst may be 
monitoring the activities of many dozens of vendors across an entire sector. These organisations will be operating and implementing in 
countries across the world. If she is to remain informed about these activities then she is reliant on this distributed and informal 
knowledge network. How else could she maintain oversight (of this market) and insight (into the practices of the vendors)? 
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Yet, this was also seen as one of the weaknesses of the tool (leading to accusations of 
‘partiality’ and ‘bias’).  
 
4.4.1 Partiality and Bias 
One issue appeared to be the obfuscation that existed around these calculative networks 
and community knowledge. That Gartner refused to make the names of their sources 
public, for instance, was a cause of much concern. There was also little information on 
how they chose specific customers as well as with the weight given to their views. During 
fieldwork, for instance, we spoke to one IT manager who was critical of how, despite the 
claim that Gartner consult widely when conducting their research, they had never solicited 
his views. He was the IT Director of a large US organisation and very active in the wider 
software community, having until recently served as president of a SoftCo User Group for 
his particular industry sector. We interviewed him initially about this presidency but the 
topic of Gartner came up. He described how he thought the particular Gartner analyst 
responsible for his sector had not been completely even-handed when assessing SoftCo’s 
solutions: 
…he has been very negative to [a new SoftCo computer system]. He has never 
called. He has never visited our site. [SoftCo] wants me to be on a conference call 
with him, but I really don’t want that. He just knows everything; he never listens… 
There are just some people you know that, I took an immediate dislike to him and 
that is because of that arrogance. But he does know a lot and Gartner is 
important… He is not against [SoftCo] he just thinks that they are a bit player and 
they are not serious. That is what I gather (author interview). 
 
Despite the fact he was well informed about SoftCo, and someone who might have been 
expected to be contacted, the practitioner was not part of Gartner’s calculative network. It 
seemed that Gartner actively differentiated between customers when gathering 
information: that access to calculative networks was ‘unevenly distributed’ (Callon & 
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Muniesa 2005). Indeed the issue of ‘bias’ implied in the above account was an aspect 
voiced several times during our fieldwork. It was, for instance, the focus of an email 
exchange between one SoftCo Solution Manager and a customer: 
Up to now I perceived their […] chief analyst […] being pretty vain - it is hard to 
turn his mind around just by facts. For the last Magic Quadrant we proved him 
being wrong in every single sentence of his comments to his (bad) assessment of 
[SoftCo], but I believe this has made him more negative about [SoftCo] than 
before (email from SoftCo to IT Manager, UserOrg). 
 
Others at SoftCo made similar points. One of the most striking features of the various 
criticisms we came across were their identification of ‘attachment’ and ‘authorship’. 
Gartner are a large, global organisation with many hundreds of analysts but nonetheless 
our informants identified one particular analyst as the source of ‘negative’ assessments. 
We mention this because it contrasts with the strategies Gartner are employing in an 
attempt to ‘objectify’ their knowledge. Whilst certain practitioners and vendors 
highlighted the ‘particularised’ nature of expertise, Gartner were pushing in the opposite 
direction through attempting to demonstrate how MQs resulted not from individual but 
‘collective expertise’. On their recently established Ombudsman Blog, for instance, a 
‘code of ethics’ was published which explicitly refuted the claim that MQs embodied bias 
and how, by contrast, they resulted from a ‘collegiate’ style research process:  
Each piece of Gartner research is subject to a rigorous peer-review process by the 
worldwide analyst team. Sign-off approval by research management is required 
prior to publication. This process is designed to surface any inconsistencies in 
research methodology, data collection and conclusions, as well as to use fully 
Gartner's collective expertise on any research topic (Gartner Website).15 
 
The objectification and commodification of community knowledge includes a process of 
‘purification’ (Power 2003) whereby Gartner were attempting to detach specific 
                                                 
15 Source Gartner website, page entitled Guiding Principles on Independence and Objectivity: http://www.gartner.com/5-
_about/company_information/guiding_principles.jsp (accessed 17 December 2007). 
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contributors from tools through emphasising the formal research protocols and ‘qualitative 
rules’ that mediate between individuals and final assessments. MQs resulted not from 
individual but global expertise; assessments were not simply ‘discretionary’ but analysts 
are strongly committed to certain ‘academic’ principles; notions like ‘peer review’, 
‘research methodologies’, ‘data collection’ etc., were an increasingly common aspect of 
Gartner’s vocabulary. They have also published the specific criteria by which they 
measure vendors; the two components of the MQ (‘ability to execute’ and ‘completeness 
of vision’) broke down to reveal a detailed list by which a vendor was measured (and they 
can score between 1 and 3 points on each of the particular sub-measures). This was an 
effort to convince that calculation was less about ‘personal discretion’ and more about the 
following of qualitative rules (Porter 1995). 
 
4.5 Extending the World of the Magic Quadrant into the Market 
We have focused on the process by which Gartner gathers information for its MQs. In this 
section, we consider how the tool is extending into the market and with how it begins to 
‘interact’ with the very thing it is attempting to describe. We do so through discussing 
how Gartner’s assessments were taken-up by one particular vendor customer and then 
with how they become a ‘resource’ that he sought to deploy in a complex set of strategic 
manoeuvres.  
 
4.5.1 The Magic Quadrant at UserOrg 
‘Sergio’ was an IT Manager at a user organisation we have described as ‘UserOrg’. Sent 
the latest version of the MQ by a SoftCo executive keen to report the ‘good news’ that 
their rating was finally improving, Sergio, in turn, circulated it among his colleagues, 
careful to add his own interpretation of what he thought the MQ was saying:  
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See attached an e-mail from [SoftCo] with some positive news that Gartner have 
improved their rating of [SoftCo’s] products within the [specific] sector. The 
diagrams are worth looking at because they show that [SoftCo] have improved 
since 2004 but also that they have a long way to go before they overtake their 
competitors (email from Sergio to colleagues). 
 
Although the vendor was keen to highlight a change in position, Sergio qualified the 
improvement through highlighting the ordinal nature of the tool and the fact that even 
though SoftCo had moved position, so too had all the others, and thus SoftCo still lagged 
behind its rivals.16 In a further series of emails, Sergio discussed with a Senior Executive 
at the vendor what he thought were the specific problems that Gartner found with SoftCo. 
He received a reply to his email in which the vendor appeared to accept the assessment: 
Yes, we need to move ‘North’ in the execution axis and ‘East’ in the vision 
section. We really need to push across the line into the ‘Leadership’ Quadrant. 
Implementation (speed, cost - same thing, to some extent) remains a challenge 
(email from SoftCo to Sergio). 
 
Here, we simply note how the properties of this vendor appeared to be settled and adjusted 
to those of the MQ. The various actors present seemed to accept the alternative 
comparative machinery set out and agree that Gartner had ‘correctly’ identified that 
SoftCo had a poor ‘ability to execute’. However, this was not the end of the matter. Far 
from it. What then developed was a fascinating and quite unexpected series of events. 
Rather than simply accepting the assessment, Sergio discussed with the vendor how he 
might be able to improve SoftCo’s position: 
…I think that the [CRM] final result will help move things much further. If we can 
then exploit BW [Business Warehouse] to include financial and other information 
                                                 
16 It is an interesting feature of MQs (much discussed in the practitioner press) that most vendors seem to make progress each year. 
These movements are often very small - more ‘creeping’ than ‘leaping’ - but the fact they do move is perhaps not wholly surprising (a 
creeping as opposed to static vendor suggests a constant process of re-calculation!). It is rumoured that some vendor executives will 
often use a ruler to check for the existence of such changes. In addition, even though vendors will advertise these as improvements, they 
are often of little significance (because what counts are movements in relation to others). One side effect of this constant improvement 
is that in some markets all vendors end up in the same square! Gartner, however, have established a process for this. They ‘retire’ a MQ 
when this happens, suggesting that the market has become sufficiently ‘mature’ such that their tool is no longer needed. 
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then we should help to move the [SoftCo] position further in the right direction. I 
think that it is important for Gartner to realise that [SoftCo] are building up 
momentum as they move across the MQ (email from Sergio to SoftCo). 
 
The ‘CRM’ project was a customer relationship management system being built by 
SoftCo and implemented within Sergio’s organisation. It was seen as a significant flagship 
venture since it brought together and integrated several previously unrelated enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) modules. What Sergio was suggesting was that, once the CRM 
project was successfully implemented, news of this could be fed back to Gartner to 
provide evidence to improve SoftCo’s standing.  
 
4.5.2 UserOrg Becomes a ‘Test Case’ 
At this stage of the fieldwork we were intrigued with how this might happen; how could 
the CRM project be linked to the MQ in this way? We watched with interest as the IT 
manager attempted to gain Gartner’s attention. Having recently become a Gartner client, 
Sergio had access to their analysts and his main point of contact was someone whom we 
described as ‘Bob’. We observed as Sergio deepened this relationship with Bob: they 
began to conduct regular telephone conversations; to participate in lengthy email 
exchanges (which we had access to); and Sergio would engineer meetings with Bob in 
various places around the world (some of which were able to observe). Sergio discussed 
this blossoming relationship with one of his colleagues:  
He [Bob] is coming to [UserOrg] in early November to a…conference. I tend to 
speak to him approximately every two weeks. He is really interested in seeing 
what we have done in UserOrg. He is also watching [KentOrg] and [PurseOrg] (?) 
at the moment. I think that he will also watch [WestOrg] in the UK as well to see 
whether [SoftCo] can hit implementation dates. I am sure that we can generate 
some really good publicity from our CRM project (email from Sergio to 
colleague). 
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According to the email, Gartner were watching a number of sites around the world from 
which it would gather evidence about SoftCo’s ability to execute. Moreover, UserOrg had 
become part of this calculative network. This raised a number of issues, not least as to 
why Sergio might go to such effort to improve SoftCo’s rating?  
 
4.5.3 Calculating Actors 
During the same period, Sergio was also in regular contact with a number of SoftCo 
executives, continuously reminding them of the influence Gartner were developing among 
decision makers. The following message was typical of these kinds of interactions:  
 
I would suggest that [SoftCo] need to be aware of quite how much influence 
Gartner are developing amongst the [specific sector] community in the UK. This 
could actually be good news, given Gartner's comments about [SoftCo] and 
[BigVendor]... But I suggest that your [sector specific] team should become well 
aware of Gartner's comments because they will certainly be known to [specific 
sector] IT Directors (though whether we would agree with them is something 
else!) (email from Sergio to SoftCo Executive).17 
 
The vendor executive replied to the manager and appeared to be grateful for the work that 
Sergio was doing with Gartner: 
I appreciate your ongoing dialogue with [Bob] of Gartner. As you know, we also 
have a parallel dialogue with [Bob]. I agree that he is looking for [SoftCo] to 
‘execute’ on the ‘vision’ (in Magic Quadrant terms) in terms of key projects such 
as yours and [PurseOrg’s] (email from SoftCo Executive to Sergio). 
 
Sergio was more explicit still in later messages, outlining the specific interest Gartner had 
taken in his project, as well as the work he was doing to encourage this attention: 
Gartner ([Bob] especially) are following every twist with great interest. He wants 
to spend much time with me in [the US] before and during [a forth-coming 
                                                 
17 There is a sentence here that is important for our argument: ‘though whether we would agree with them is something else!’ Through 
this comment, the manager called into question the accuracy of Gartner’s assessment of Softco. However, even though Sergio appeared 
to be sceptical of the assessment, this was not necessarily important, because he still used it.  
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conference] (he's invited me on to a User Panel on the Sunday [sector specific] 
Symposium to discuss the question ‘What message would I like to give to my ERP 
vendor?’!!). He also intends to visit [UserOrg] during his trip to [UK conference] 
(being held in the [UserOrg] area at the beginning of November). I am giving him 
very positive messages - he is very interested in the timescales of the project – 
possibly, because he is looking for evidence that [SoftCo] can implement 
good/solid implementations in a short time-scale. He is looking for similar 
evidence from [KentOrg] and some other critical US implementations (email from 
IT Manager to SoftCo). 
 
Sergio outlined to the vendor how their position on the MQ was now becoming directly 
linked to their performance at UserOrg. What Sergio hoped to achieve was to exert 
pressure on SoftCo to continue to devote resources to his CRM project (the development 
had started well but had been floundering in recent months). In turn, SoftCo needed to 
improve (not worsen) their ranking. Sergio thus anticipated that Gartner’s interest would 
have a positive effect on the vendor. In another email to a colleague, Sergio described his 
overall aims: 
Things are getting ever more interesting for me and the [SoftCo] relationship. They 
are really moving in to a ‘partnership’ role - throwing in highly competent 
resources to ensure that we go live on 10th October. Though I guess it helps that 
they realise that [a senior Gartner analyst] has told them that Gartner are watching 
[SoftCo’s] ability to implement at each of 3 [organisations] in the world 
([UserOrg], [KentOrg] and [PurseOrg]) and that their results will materially affect 
whether [SoftCo] move from the lower left quadrant to the top-right! (email from 
Sergio to colleague). 
 
To summarise this section, the MQ had two principal effects. Firstly, it framed the setting 
so that the means by which vendor rankings can be improved has been defined. No longer 
an abstract or difficult to measure notion, vendor performance was translated into the most 
tangible of things: to repeat Sergio’s words, the implementation of its systems in the three 
organisations ‘will materially affect whether SoftCo move from the lower left quadrant to 
the top-right’. Secondly, the fact it tied in vendor rankings with the success of these 
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projects opened up the possibility of new kinds of action. In particular, the MQ became a 
‘resource’ for actors to calculate and act in different ways (Miller 2001).  
 
4.6 We Can’t Delay the Go-live 
Let us now turn to the CRM project, for if SoftCo was to improve its position, it was 
essential the implementation continued smoothly. Indeed as the go-live date approached, 
everything appeared to be going well. Despite initial problems, SoftCo had now ‘pulled 
out all the stops’ to ensure everything was a success. Overnight, however, serious 
problems emerged and some amongst the internal IT team at UserOrg were asking Sergio 
to postpone the go-live till later in the month. Yet Sergio was reluctant to move the date, 
seeing any delay as damaging; it was the kind of evidence that would underwrite Gartner’s 
(poor) assessment of SoftCo. This presented Sergio with something of a dilemma: to 
follow the advice of his team and postpone the go-live date; or to soldier on as planned 
and hope things would work out. Sergio spelt out the nature of the problem in a message 
to his internal IT team, suggesting they should carry on:  
I'm trying everything to ensure that we do not delay the go-live. It critically 
depends upon [SoftCo] resource availability. Gartner are watching closely because 
they have severe questions about [SoftCo’s] ‘ability to execute’ within the [sector 
specific] environment. They have no problem with [SoftCo’s] ‘Vision’. Their 
views of these two parameters result in [SoftCo’s] position in the Magic Quadrant. 
They are currently NOT in the ‘top right’ quadrant (email from Sergio to his IT 
team). 
 
Sergio knew a delay would be potentially ruinous for SoftCo; not only would their 
position on the MQ be affected but he suspected that further Gartner criticism would 
negatively influence SoftCo’s decision whether to continue investing in this particular 
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industry sector.18 Thus, he decided to push ahead with the go-live, fully aware the 
software was not properly tested (and that it would introduce risks to his own 
organisation).19 Nevertheless, and despite his efforts, further problems mounted up and, 
several days later, the realisation dawns that they were not going to meet the go-live date. 
The project therefore was postponed. However, a second go live target was quickly set 
and when the new date arrives, and despite the fact many problems had still not being 
resolved, the system was implemented. A few days passed and it became apparent that in 
the rush to implement everything was not as it should be; there were numerous difficulties 
and it was thus decided to shut down the live system whilst problems were rectified. In the 
meantime, this provided Sergio with a difficult issue: how should he break the news to 
Bob? The implementation has not gone as planned, there were major ‘issues’ with the 
vendor, and UserOrg was left without an external facing system for several days. In an 
email to Bob, about a different issue, he added the following postscript: 
The [CRM] project at [UserOrg] is continuing to go really well. I have decided 
NOT to risk going live on 10th October but to delay until later in the month. We 
will still have succeeded in going from project mobilisation to go live on a raft of 
[SoftCo] modules in 8 months - I just don't want to risk things by implementing 
without exhaustive user testing. However, I will be able to demonstrate to you 
what we have done in a ‘QA’ environment, if you wish to see it (Sergio’s email to 
Gartner).   
 
What Sergio did was to put to one side the various problems in favour of the more positive 
message. Gartner would not be told of the ‘chaos’ that ensued at UserOrg. How are we to 
understand this? This was also a kind of calculation that made vendors comparable, 
                                                 
18 With a negative Gartner assessment hanging over them, he fears the team within SoftCo specializing in this sector will have 
difficulties in mobilizing resources to continue to develop the suite of systems for this particular market. 
19 He describes this risk in the following message: “Apart from the immediate [CRM] project team, I am now also passing the message 
around the rest of the ISS that we will have to go live on 10th October – ‘cold turkey’ techniques may well be required. This will 
introduce risks to several other areas (e.g. inadequate testing of the ‘common desktop’ image across all 10,000…PCs etc.)… However, 
we will need to prepare detail cover/support plans for the days/weeks after 10th October because we know that we will be going live 
without adequate testing/training…” (message from Sergio to internal project team, our emphasis). 
 36 
though it may not typically be phrased in that way (since it could just as easily be 
described as a ploy). However, there was more to this than the notion of a ‘ploy’ suggests 
(Callon & Law 2005). The MQ was supposed to describe vendors but, as we saw, it 
interacted with these entities, ‘encouraging’ Sergio to stick to the original implementation 
strategy, inviting him to conform to an ideal (a demonstrated ability to execute). Thus, 
Sergio drew a boundary around the things that would go forward to Gartner; SoftCo’s 
failings would not be taken into account.  
 
4.7 How Gartner Defends its Assessments 
We have argued that, in compiling these tools, Gartner hand the discretion over to others: 
as Gartner were keen to emphasise, it was not them, but the wider ‘user community’ 
providing judgements on vendors. In effect, these others had the power to say whether a 
vendor could execute or had vision. We describe this process through analysing how one 
satellite reported back to Gartner (and in so doing how he forced Gartner to defend its 
position). The particular episode took place in the US where Gartner was organising a 
Symposium to coincide with a major IT conference. The IT manager from UserOrg, 
Sergio, travels to the conference, one of his aims being to update Gartner on progress of 
his CRM project. 
 
At the conference, one of the authors of this paper (NP) was sitting conducing an informal 
interview with Sergio when Bob from Gartner approached. Bob straightaway began to tell 
Sergio how he has just heard that SoftCo were already having difficulties with one of the 
user organisations Gartner was watching (WestOrg):  
Bob: Chris [from WestOrg] and I were just talking, she’s, she has put some 
ultimatums out with them [SoftCo]. 
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Sergio: Yeah, the real problem with them, [WestOrg], is that they have always 
written their own systems and they have gone for BoB [best of breed] but when 
they start hitting sort of a [GenteSys] or a [SoftCo] they think that it is going to be 
straightforward….So, so she has got problems? 
 
Bob: She said that they are 2 million pounds over budget and they haven’t even 
started implementation.  
 
Sergio: Oh, I think that a lot of that is going be, the guys from [SoftCo], the ones 
that I have been talking to. It is just that the account manager of the [nationality] is 
bloody useless. 
 
Bob: But that is a key… 
 
Sergio: …what’s absolutely critical, what [SoftCo] have been doing, is that in the 
UK, they have been recruiting, and they have been recruiting some really good 
people. But those guys, I don’t see them at [WestOrg] yet…  
 
 
This interchange was interesting because Bob began the conversation by highlighting 
SoftCo’s failings through invoking the ‘community’ view (it was not him but Chris from 
WestOrg criticising SoftCo). In contrast, Sergio attempted to defend SoftCo through 
shifting the focus back onto WestOrg’s lack of experience with these kinds of large 
generic software packages. He also suggested that things were improving since SoftCo has 
just recruited ‘some really good people’. This exchange went on for some in this manner 
with both providing contrasting evidence. Sergio was forcing Bob to both explain and 
defend his assessment of SoftCo, which Bob appeared able to do – in a robust manner. 
This confrontation continued and eventually Bob has to be less guarded telling Sergio 
what he thought were the real problems with SoftCo:  
I told them [SoftCo] seven or eight years ago that they needed to start investing in 
the [specific] sector. We have a saying: ‘do something or get off the pot’. Have 
you ever heard that? (Sergio: yeah). In essence what I told them, it’s like ‘You put 
your toe in [specific sector] but you really haven’t committed’. They said ‘We just 
hired! We got 10 people writing the [sector] system’ [Sergio: Gosh]. I said ‘Are 
you kidding me?’ I said ‘how can you? I mean, that’s embarrassing!’ I said ‘The 
smallest software companies in the US…would have 50 or 60’. I mean, [DataSys] 
have got 50, 60 people. [GenteSys] have 100, 150. [BigVendor] have 150. You 
know 10 people is just nothing! They are up to, I don’t know, 20, 25 now but still 
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it is not what I would call for the size of the company, I mean they have the 
resources to be a global leader in [specific sector] if they want to be. It is just that 
they have just never made the commitment. And that is what you are saying? 
 
What we had here were two actors opposing each other through offering contrasting 
accounts of the qualities of a vendor. Sergio openly challenged Gartner’s assessment of 
SoftCo and Bob was forced to defend their position. Whilst Sergio stated that SoftCo was 
improving, it was clear to Bob that they were not sufficiently committed to the particular 
sector. As he saw it, they were being opportunistic in this market (‘they could be the 
global leader in [specific sector] if only they wanted to be’). This particular thread of 
conversation ended when Sergio was forced to fall into line with Gartner’s assessment. 
Despite all his previous efforts, Sergio has to concede the territory to Gartner and accept 
their assessment.20  
 
5 Conclusions 
Specialist industry analysts and IT research firms have been highly active in exploiting the 
uncertainties that exist in technology procurement through generating and selling 
assessments of the relative location and standing of vendors as well as the efficacies of 
their solutions. Owing to the increasing range, escalating complexity and rapid evolution 
of IT products, the knowledge produced by these organisations is gaining in relevance. 
They are ‘organising’ the marketplace through mobilising promise and shaping 
                                                 
20 In the final stages of writing this article, the latest version of the MQ was posted to us by a vendor (SoleSys, once again the leading 
vendor). We excitedly opened the envelope to see whether SoftCo’s position had changed. Had Sergio’s activities had any effect on the 
position of the vendors? We found SoftCo was placed more or less as in the previous year (though our ruler tells us there was indeed 
some ‘creep’). It had moved slightly ‘northwards’ on the ability to execute axis but there was no change in its ordinal position. 
However, the text accompanying the tool did make interesting reading. There was mention, for instance, of how “[SoftCo] is gaining 
valuable experience from ongoing implementations at [KentOrg] and [PurseOrg]” and how these would be used to judge the position of 
SoftCo in the near future: “[w]hile there are ongoing projects at other institutions, [SoftCo’s] future success in [particular industry 
sector] will rest on its ability to implement the [name of system] at these two [organisations]….”. There was an also indirect mention of 
Sergio at UserOrg and the success he had in persuading SoftCo to take his project more seriously: “The [industry sector] product 
development team works closely with its current customers, and the user group is active and influential, including areas such as 
[industry specific] CRM and business intelligence”. 
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expectations amongst vendor and user communities alike. However, the critical social 
sciences have been slow to explain the influence of this kind of knowledge. One reason 
for this is that the social study of IT is narrowly focused (Kallinikos 2004): heavily 
influenced by ‘situated’ and ‘localist’ conceptions of technology it lacks sophisticated 
enough analytical schema to capture how wider actors and intermediaries like industry 
analysts shape markets and influence local action; this partially explains why the 
important role of industry analysts in shaping technological fields does not appear on the 
social science radar (author study).  
Our broad purpose has been to encourage greater interest in the kinds of market shaping 
phenomena described here by sketching out the sociology of a market analysis tool. More 
specifically, we have shown how an IT research organisation produced and calculated the 
standing of vendors through the production of its Magic Quadrant (MQ) tool but whilst 
doing so we have paid attention to contested nature of these assessments. A further interest 
has been in the attempts by its authors to establish the tool as an ‘impartial’ and 
‘legitimate’ arbiter of vendor performance.  
 
The tool may have been studied from a variety of academic perspectives (i.e., in terms of 
debunking, convention), however, we chose to develop an (arguably) more productive 
form of analysis whereby we could study the creation and the ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of 
these tools. We deployed recent ideas from Economic Sociology (Callon 1998, 1999, 
2007) and the Sociology of Finance (MacKenzie 2003, 2006a,b) where it has been 
suggested that economic theories and financial models play a crucial role in the doing of 
the economy. Adapting this argument to the case of industry analysts, we asked: To what 
extent is the advice of industry analysts ‘performative’? By this, we refer to the ways in 
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which their research actively pushes or ‘nudges’ innovation or procurement choices in 
certain directions.21  
 
Callon (2007) has described economic and financial theories as putting in motion a socio-
technical agencement. Theories are successful (i.e., performative), he argues, when they 
create their corresponding socio-technical agencement (the ‘context’ or ‘world’ they point 
to). We have analysed the MQ describing four particular moments. Firstly, in enacting this 
world, the industry analysts potentially reshaped how people made decisions whilst 
choosing between vendors. The device (a ‘technology of comparison’) offered an 
alternative comparative machinery through bringing vendors together in the same space 
and putting previously incommensurable technologies on a scale. It has defined the two 
dimensions of this scale and created the possibility of ordinal assessment and ranking of 
vendors. Secondly, we have described the actualisation of this world through the 
construction of a research process whereby industry analysts could speak ‘authoritatively’ 
about the competence and performance of software vendors. They set up an extensive 
‘calculative network’ where analysts drew on the views and opinions of those 
implementing and using the technologies of the vendors under analysis. This knowledge 
has an unusual quality (being informal and highly contingent and potentially subjective). 
The analysts thus attempt to find a way whereby this ‘community knowledge’ is no longer 
the highly situated form of knowledge it once was but can be turned into a form of more 
                                                 
21 Importantly, we are by no means suggesting all IT research is performative in the same way. During fieldwork, for instance, it was 
clear that some forms of advice were more influential than others. Why was this? Other assessments, particularly future oriented ones, 
were more speculative, which raised related questions regarding how industry analysts deal with ‘failure’ (i.e. where predictions and 
assessments were found to be incorrect)? The aim of future research is thus to consider different features of the research and tools 
produced by analysts. One research challenge here concerns whether it is possible to construct a typology of prediction and assessment, 
which would characterise differences between statements in terms of effects. 
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robust - commodified - knowledge that could ‘travel the world’ (we return to this point 
below).  
 
Fourthly, this particular socio-technical agencement has begun to constitute the 
marketplace in various ways. It has established a number of new realities – or, to use the 
language from the start of the paper, it has become ‘successful’. Actors increasingly act 
according to the tool. Vendors, for instance, as do many of their customers, increasingly 
describe themselves according to this new comparative machinery. ‘Ability to execute’ 
and ‘completeness of vision’ have come to be treated as unproblematic (as well as 
‘researchable’ and ‘assessable’) measures of vendor performance. Moreover, the device 
not only constitutes the activities of vendors but increasingly users. We saw one IT 
manager attempt to provide evidence of a vendor’s improving performance. Even though 
his intervention did not have the success anticipated, the episode demonstrates how the IT 
is increasingly ‘framed’ and this actor ‘equipped’. This suggests people are increasingly 
able to see the effects of their actions in relation to these kinds of tools – and to act 
accordingly.22 
 
Finally, and to return to the place where we begun this paper, all of this builds towards our 
thesis which is the argument that these tools are not arbitrary but contains defensible forms 
of knowledge (as could be seen by Bob’s strong rebuttal of Sergio’s attempt to influence). 
This is not to say that the tools are viewed uncritically. As we have shown, the tool 
inhabits an interesting ‘grey space’. They are critiqued (mostly in the practitioner press) 
because amongst other things analysts are not always independent of those they assess. In 
                                                 
22 These kinds of outcomes have been noted with similar types of ranking devices – such as those that attempt to sort University 
Business Schools (see Free et al. in press). 
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Callon’s terms, we might see these criticisms as ‘competing’ socio-technical agencements 
attempting to problematise the world set out by the MQ. Imposing new worlds, argues 
Callon, always causes alternative ones to ‘strike back’. Interestingly, industry analysts 
have themselves not stood still, actively defending their tool. Recently, for instance, we 
found these organisations to be more forthcoming about (and in some cases making 
public) methodologies and research processes, and pointing to the collective and 
‘collegiate’ nature of their research process. Thus, arguably, their assessments may be 
seen as constituting a new kind of privately provided public good, which is not subject to 
the strict controls of independent ‘scientific’ knowledge (Shapin 1994), for example, but 
which has its own particular forms of accountability. The nature of this legitimation and 
accountability, the process by which industry analysts attempt to establish their tools as 
‘impartial’ and ‘legitimate’ arbiters of vendor performance, is an area that demands further 
research (Preda 2005). 
 
To conclude, we have identified the important role played by these new kinds of 
intermediary in establishing the performance and standing of vendors; and how by 
enabling systematic, commodified access to community knowledge, industry analysts and 
IT research firms have provided the grounds for more formalised and systematised 
assessments of vendors and their offerings. Glückler and Armbrüster (2003) have noted 
the trade-offs between different kinds of reputational evidence guiding selection choice 
along a spectrum between direct local experience based knowledge and public reputation. 
In terms of the former, they note this knowledge is difficult to acquire as being limited in 
its coverage (uncompetitively limiting the adopting organisations ranges of partners to 
those it already knows). In terms of the latter, they point to its mixed and indeterminate 
reliability and the fact it only emerges slowly (and thus may be of limited use in rapidly 
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changing contexts of innovation). They thus highlight an intermediate form, networked 
reputation, and the importance of social networks in providing a modicum of timely 
information based on a broad base. Such inter-organisational networks are seen as critical 
across many areas of innovation, including software procurement (Swan & Newell 1995). 
Networked reputation may be difficult to acquire however. Glückler and Armbrüster 
(2003: 291) call for more research into the operation of the mechanisms of networked 
reputation and the informal social institutions that support economic exchange.  
 
Taking this argument further, our study draws attention to a phenomenon that has received 
little academic attention, but which is growing in importance, and that is the 
commodification of networked reputation through the efforts of industry analysts, which 
act as repositories for knowledge across the vendor and user communities and supply this 
community knowledge back to them on a commodified basis. The role of industry analysts 
in IT procurement points to one mechanism for enhancing the efficiency of networked 
reputation formation through the commodification and canalisation of the circulation of 
community knowledge (and the way this is subject to particular forms of accountability). 
We see this as a response to the deep uncertainties surrounding the procurement of 
organisational technologies. Gartner and other analysts help shape community sentiment 
about the boundaries of technological fields and their future direction of innovation. Their 
work – this commodification of networked reputation – can no longer be simply ignored 
but deserves further attention. 
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